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ANSWERS NEEDED

(Mr. JOHANSEN (at the request of Mr. CONTE) was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. JOHANSEN. Mr. Speaker, for more than 3 weeks there have been widely published reports of a substantial buildup of Soviet—and possibly Red Chinese—military personnel and equipment in Cuba.

Estimates indicate recent arrival of 5,000 or more personnel.

The matter was the subject of extensive questions and answers at the President's press conference yesterday. Upshot of his replies is as follows:

First. There is an expanded Soviet "advisory and technical mission" in Cuba, which may include "additional military advisory personnel or technicians."

Second. We do not have evidence that there are Russian troops—as it is generally understood—there.

Third. As to reported shipments of anti-aircraft missiles to Cuba, "we have no such information as yet"—but "that does not mean that there have not been."

Fourth. The President stated that he "is not for invading Cuba at this time"—to which he added, "I think it would be a mistake to invade Cuba."

Fifth. The President indicated that any action regarding Cuba must be weighed in the light of our global obligations and "the very sensitive" situation all around the world, particularly in Berlin.

It seems to me these disclosures raise extremely crucial questions—questions which should not be answered publicly but to the appropriate leadership and committee members of both parties in the Congress.

First. Is the scanty information as to what is actually happening in Cuba due

to any incompetence or dereliction of our intelligence services?

Second. Should the President continue to submit himself to impromptu press conference questioning regarding Cuba which requires him to tell our enemies what we do not intend to do, or which compel him to advertise to our enemies our misgivings about taking any effective action?

Third. Are our global commitments so broad—and the global hazards so precarious—that our initiative in any area or in the face of any specific peril is virtually paralyzed?

Fourth. If, in the phrase being heard in Washington these days, we must hesitate to act in Cuba because Russia has "a rope around our neck in Berlin," how long will it be before we dare not act in self-defense anywhere in the world because Russia has "a dagger at our heart" in Cuba?

Fifth. What assurance do we have that Soviet military forces—of whatever type—in Cuba, ostensibly there for "defensive purposes," will not in fact later become actual cannon of the Cuban island, potential guerrilla forces for use against other Latin American countries, or even a potential missile strike force against the United States?

Sixth. If invasion and liberation of Cuba by the United States is ruled out, are we also ruled out vigorous counter-measures in the form of an effective embargo of further shipments of Soviet personnel and military equipment to Cuba?

Seventh. If we are to rely on an internal uprising within Cuba as its only hope of liberation—which would seem progressively unlikely of success if Soviet "occupation forces" continue to build up—have we any plans for assistance for such an uprising? If such assistance proves indispensable to its success?

These questions are not raised in capricious criticism. The President must have complete bipartisan support in this crisis. But the President and the administration must provide leadership.

The starting point for such leadership is full and frank consultation to the appropriate Members of Congress.